Chapter Nine
The Battle
of Murfreesboro
Retreating from Kentucky, the disheartened Confederate Army reached Knoxville the last week in
October. Polk, Hardee, and Kirby Smith were commissioned lieutenant generals
and rumors circulated suggesting Cleburne’s
promotion to major general. Robert D. Smith thought that the promotion should
occur. Apart from his performance on the field of battle, Smith admired his
leadership qualities, which he observed during one of the “most unpleasant days
I ever spent” in camp. The snow had commenced falling at midnight and was now
some three inches deep. The wind was blowing “very hard” and Smith’s tent,
which he had used since Corinth,
afforded “little protection”. During this storm, Smith saw Cleburne sharing “all the hardships of his
men” by “keeping a camp fire warm the same as any private in the ranks”. “It is
a great pity”, Smith wrote, “that more of the officers
don’t follow his example.” (1)
On November 4, the brigade left Knoxville,
arriving in Chattanooga
that same day. By the end of that month, the newly-renamed Army of Tennessee
arrived by rail in the Stones River Valley
and formed a wide arch around Murfreesboro
with the town as its command center. The Federal Army, now commanded by William
S. Rosecrans, had marched from Bowling
Green and Glasgow into Middle
Tennessee and occupied Nashville.
In Hardee’s Corps, Simon
Buckner, Hardee’s senior division commander, left Tennessee
to command a garrison in Mobile.
A major general would have to be appointed to command Buckner’s old division.
Hardee, in recommendation of Cleburne
for that position, wrote President Davis stating a brief summery of his career
and complementing “the unmistakable proofs of military talent of a high order”.
Cleburne,
Hardee wrote, “unites the rare qualities of a strict disciplinarian, a brave
and skilful leader and a popular commander”. Buckner, too, indorsed Cleburne to the position
instead of his own skilful brigadiers, S.A.M. Wood and Bushrod Johnson. (2)
That fall, things were brewing between
Bragg and his subordinates. Almost immediately after the army arrived in Murfreesboro, Kirby Smith
left for the Confederate capitol to complain about Bragg’s inability as
commander. Hardee, in a letter to the Confederate capitol concerning his “unpardonable
errors” during the Kentucky Campaign, wrote that “Bragg has proved a failure.” Along
with the allegations from generals, the southern presses began to attack Bragg
for incompetence. In late October, Bragg was called to Richmond to tell his side of the story to
President Davis. Bragg explained that the dissatisfaction in the army was
caused by only a few men and that the army was generally in good spirits. Davis believed Bragg and
sustained him as commander of the Army of Tennessee. Nevertheless, Davis sent a recuperating Joseph E. Johnston to Murfreesboro to further
inspect the army’s condition. (3)
Johnston, a West Point
graduate from the old army, had been the original commander in the Eastern
Theater. It was only after the wounds he received from the Battle of Seven
Pines made him unfit for duty that General Lee took command. Some time after
this, Johnston was appointed to overall
commander of both Tennessee and Mississippi, with the
purpose of uniting the departments and driving out the invader. This large
assignment was made even more difficult by the separation of the departments by
the Mississippi River and the great distance
which separated them. Nevertheless, Johnston
believed that, as Bragg’s numbers were inferior to Rosecrans’, the attention must
be turned towards Vicksburg which was endangered
by Grant, by giving him battle with the forces of Holmes (Arkansas),
Pemberton (Mississippi),
and Bragg, if practicable.
Upon arriving in Chattanooga,
Johnston met
the president, who described the situation. Pemberton was falling back from
superior forces and requested reinforcements. The president suggested the
transfer of 9,000 troops from Bragg’s army for that purpose. Johnston
agreed that troops must be sent at once, but not Bragg’s, as his numbers were
already too small to hold Rosecrans back for any extended period of time. He
suggested instead the transfer of a portion of Holmes’ troops in Arkansas which were
inactive and closer of Pemberton. The president disagreed and ordered
Stevenson’s Division and a brigade of McCown’s be sent
at once to Pemberton from Tennessee.
During the first week of December, Johnston was ordered to
report on the condition of Bragg’s army and its commander. Johnston, who knew
little of Bragg’s movements during the past campaign, arrived in camp, his mind
full of pressing matters which were occurring in Mississippi. After a quick interview with
several generals, Johnston
concluded that the present commander was fit for duty.
While these events were occurring, Cleburne’s Brigade served as part of the protective “arch”
around Murfreesboro.
Their camp, a very cold outpost at College Grove, was situated 20 miles west of Murfreesboro. During this
winter, Cleburne
learned that one of his soldiers had been placed under arrest for refusing to
turn out for work detail. Instead of dismissing the issue as disobedience, Cleburne wished to know
more about the incident and discovered the real reason for the soldier’s
refusal: he had no shoes. Cleburne
ordered the man to be released, and rode off to army headquarters to speak to
the quartermaster. The next day, a wagon load of shoes were delivered to his
command.
While on duty, Cleburne’s men missed one of the most
celebrated events of the year. Colonel John Hunt Morgan, commander of the 2nd
Kentucky Cavalry, was married to local belle Martha Ready in Murfreesboro. The courthouse was decked with
captured Federal flags that hung upside down, Morgan’s men built bonfires and
regimental bands play southern tunes. Generals Bragg, Hardee, Chatham, and Breckinridge
were in attendance for the gala. President Davis also showed up and confirmed Cleburne’s appointment to
major general as well as Morgan’s appointment to brigadier general. On the
downside, Davis
stated that Bragg would stay in command of the army.
After dinner, a group of officers gathered
in the Ready’s library.
A Dr. Yandell, known for his ability to imitate people was performing ‘Hardee’.
Bragg was in attendance, watching Yandell perform, when he was called from the
room. Seizing the opportunity, the officers pleaded Yandell to ‘do Bragg’.
Yandell complied and began strutting to and fro, arms waving while rasping
about the lack of discipline in the army. At this untimely moment, Bragg walked
in.
Although Cleburne missed this event his brother Chris
had not. After the celebration, Chris, a member of Morgan’s Cavalry, traveled
to Collage Grove to visit his brother and congratulate him on his promotion to
major general. As a gift, Patrick gave Chris a fine new horse. Although only 25
miles from his home, Robert D. Smith could not get a leave until after the
expected fight, but was visited several times by his family for Christmas.
As a major general, Cleburne was in command
of a small “army”, which included his old brigade, designated the First
Brigade, now commanded by Brigadier General Lucius Polk, the Second Brigade
commanded by Brigadier General St. John R. Liddell and comprised of Arkansas
regiments, the Third Brigade commanded by Brigadier General Bushrod Johnson’s
Tennesseans, and the Forth Brigade of Alabamians and Mississippians commanded
by Brigadier General S.A.M. Wood. Attached to the division were four batteries:
Calvert’s, Swett’s, Darden’s, and Semple’s. Cleburne’s staff was also enlarged. Leonard
Mangum and Sylvanus Hanly, son of Judge Hanly, remained aide-de-camps. A former
‘49er and aide to Albert Sidney Johnston, Calhoun Benham became chief of staff.
Although Benham and Cleburne did not always see
eye to eye, Benham remained on staff, even writing a musketry manual at Cleburne’s dictation, until he received injuries at Atlanta. T.R. Hotchkiss,
of Mississippi,
was the division’s chief of artillery. Captain Irving Buck, the young man who
witnessed the street fight in Baltimore,
became the assistant adjutant-general. In a letter home he wrote that the
general and his “staff are a very pleasant set of gentlemen” and that Cleburne “is quiet, has
little to say, and any one to see and not know him would take him much sooner
for a private than a major Gen’l” The inspector-general, Major Dixon was a
rather strict man. A veteran of Cleburne’s
old brigade recalled:
The Major was very exacting. He would order
the men to stand at right dress at shoulder arms while he instructed the
commissioned and non commissioned officers. The men would frequently change
positions a little for comfort, and whenever he saw any of them do so he would
order them out of line and put them on extra duty at headquarters. This
severity became an annoyance to all of the division, until it was common for
four or five hundred men to go out to see the ridiculous performance. A crisis
came one morning when General Cleburne and his Adjutant went out to see the
Majors performances. He had his men to right dress at shoulder arms and open
ranks, and commenced his instructions to the officers as usual. As soon as this
happened Adjutant General Buck left General Cleburne and went to the Major,
said something to him, and returned to where General Cleburne was. The Major in
the meantime was instructing as usual. General Cleburne then commanded in a
loud, clear voice, “Major Dickson, bring the men to order arms while you give
those instructions not in the book.” The old rebel yell was given with a hearty
good will. For a long time after this when Major Dickson would come by the command
some one would halloo out, “Who gave the instructions not in the book?” “Major
Dickson!” would be the answer in chorus by nearly every one in hearing
distance. The last time the writer ever heard it thrown into the Major's face
General Cleburne was with him, and the General said, “Boys, I don't believe I
would worry him any more, as he is sorry of it.”
Although
the infantry “would suffer any privation when necessary” they
“resisted useless hardship or
indignities”. Cleburne
was well aware of this and never punished his men by humiliation, as was common
in the rest of Bragg’s army. Instead, his disciplinary measures usually went as
far as compelling a soldier to “carry a fence rail for a mile”. Cleburne wanted to appoint
Robert D. Smith as chief-of-ordinance, but he was informed by Hardee that
Charles Hill was to fill that role. Smith complained that “none of our old
staff have been promoted”. Smith kept his role as chief-of-ordinance to Polk’s
Brigade. (4)
As Joseph E. Johnston predicted, the
transfer of troops from
Tennessee proved to be a precursor to
Rosecrans’ advance out of Nashville,
which began the day after Christmas and was first detected by Wheeler’s Cavalry.
As the 54,000 man army began bearing down on Murfreesboro, the Confederate outposts detached groups of infantry and cavalry to impeded
their advance and buy time for Bragg’s 37,000 man army to form a line of battle.
Cleburne ordered his Forth
Brigade (Wood’s), located about five miles north of College Grove at Triune, to
stall the enemy, then rejoin the division for battle around Murfreesboro.
S.A.M. Wood’s Brigade consisted of two
companies of sharpshooters, the 16th and 33rd Alabama
Regiments, and the 45th Mississippi Regiment; in all, totaling about
950 men. Wood placed the 45th Mississippi 1 ½ miles from Triune on
the Nolensville Pike with “four companies deployed as skirmishers on the right
of the road, three supporting a section of Darden's battery on the left, and
one deployed as skirmishers on the left flank”. The Federals appeared at about
9am on December 27. The enemy attempted three times to unlimber a battery about
500 yards from this position, but Darden’s Battery
drove him away each time with precision fire. (5)
Federal cavalry now appeared “in large numbers”
on both of the Confederate’s flanks. While Wharton’s Cavalry held these in
check, Wood ordered the 45th Mississippi
and the artillery south of Triune to the Confederate’s second line of defense.
Here, the 16th Alabama
was formed as skirmishers behind a stone wall; Darden’s and White’s Batteries
were placed near this. Meanwhile, Wood had deployed 20 men to report to a
Captain Green of the engineers to burn the bridge just north of Triune so as to
delay the advancing Federals. Green and his men did this, despite the enemy
shells that fell all around them. (6)
The Federals began to shell the
Confederate’s position from the heights near Triune. As Darden’s and White’s
Batteries could not reach the Federal batteries, they were pulled back behind
the crest of a hill. About this time, Federal cavalry began advancing toward
the Confederate’s left. Fearing they would be overcome, Wood ordered the two
batteries be brought back to the top of the hill and fire on the cavalry. “Many
saddles were emptied and the whole thrown into confusion” wrote Wood. (7)
Wood wrote that at this time “a heavy storm
of hail and rain beat in our faces, concealing the movements of the enemy. It
had not abated before [the enemy] was found to be advancing with a line of
infantry extending a mile in length. Our skirmishers fired quickly upon the
line, but seeing the overwhelming forces against us, General Wharton and myself concluded at once to retire.” Wood’s Brigade marched
into the night and stopped near Eagleville, arriving in Murfreesboro the next morning. (8)
By the 29, Cleburne’s Division had united was ordered to
“form line of battle north of Murfreesborough [sic] and east of Stone's River”.
Hardee wrote: “I arranged my troops in two lines,
Breckinridge's division forming the first line and Cleburne's the second”. (9)
General Hardee quickly noticed
that the “field of battle offered no peculiar advantages for defense” save
cedar breaks that gave protection from advancing infantry and artillery
shells. Stone’s River itself was an obvious
disadvantage, splitting the right flank (Hardee) from the left (Polk). “At this
time the stream could everywhere be passed without difficulty by infantry, and
at the usual fords was not more than ankle-deep, but heavy rains in a few hours
swell it to an impassable torrent, and it subsides as rapidly.” (10)
Late on the 29, the enemy began
to extend its line to the right. This endangered the Confederate’s left with
being outflanked so Bragg sent McCown’s Division up from reserve to continue
Polk’s line. That next day, Polk and Hardee’s Corps engaged the enemy in heavy
skirmishing. Bragg informed Richmond:
Artillery
firing at intervals and heavy skirmishing of light troops all day. Enemy very cautious, and declining a general engagement. Armies are in
line of battle within sight. (11)
Later on that day, Bragg called Hardee and Polk into his tent.
There, Bragg explained that they would assail the enemy the following day.
However, some changes would have to be made before then. Leaving Breckinridge’s
Division on the right, Hardee was to take Cleburne’s
Division quietly to the Confederate’s far left, and there he would form a line
behind McCown’s Division. Cleburne
and McCown would advance the ensuing day and fold the Federal’s right flank
“back like a jackknife blade until they cut the Nashville Pike behind the
Federal front lines”. (12)
Cleburne wrote: “I lay,
inactive, in line of battle until the evening of the 30th, when I received
orders to move from the right to the left of the army. Arriving at the fording
place on Stone's River, I received orders to remain there until General Hardee
had examined the ground and determined my position. It was dark when staff
officers were sent to order me forward and show me my position.” As they prepared for crossing the bone-chilling waters of
Stone’s River, a cold pelting rain fell. “The passage of the river in
the night was attended with many difficulties, and my whole division was not in
position before midnight”. (13)
When all 6,000 of
his men were across, Cleburne
did his best to judge where he was in the Confederate line. A line of campfires
broke through the pitch blackness to the right. He concluded that: “my line was
a prolongation to the left of Cheatham's line, and was 400 or 500 yards in rear
of McCown's division”. (14)
Cleburne rode forward and
discussed the coming fight with McCown’s brigadiers. Returning to his division,
he received a circular from General Hardee that ordered all brigade commanders
to have their commands ready by 4:30 am and to “fall into line without signal
from bugle or drum”. Cleburne
relayed this information to Polk, Liddell, Johnson, and Wood in an abandoned
farmhouse and briefed them as to their position. Sometime well after midnight,
he laid down on the cold wet ground to await dawn. (15)
That next morning,
Hardee sent Wharton’s Cavalry forward to fall upon the Federal’s right flank
and rear while McCown and Cleburne
advanced. Cleburne
had his men in position before daylight. He placed Lucius Polk’s Brigade with
Calvert’s battery on the right, Bushrod Johnson’s Brigade with Darden’s Battery in the center, and St John Liddell’s Brigade with
the Warren Light Artillery on the left. Wood’s Brigade was placed in reserve of
Polk’s Brigade.
The familiar blue flag of Pat Cleburne’s
command was unraveled in the cool morning breeze and the division advanced. Cleburne wrote: “It was
not yet clear day when I received orders from General Hardee to advance.
Swinging to the right as I moved forward, I rapidly communicated these
instructions to brigade commanders, caused my division to load, and moved
forward, stepping short upon the right and full upon the left, so as to swing
round my left as directed”. As Cleburne’s Division steadily marched swung
around to the right, a gap formed between them and Cheatham’s Division.
This problem was quickly solved by extending the line to the right with Wood’s
Brigade. (16)
After marching about half a mile, heavy
firing was heard near the division’s front. Cleburne supposed this was McCown’s Division
engaging the enemy. “A few moments more, and the enemy's skirmishers opened
fire along the right and left center of my division, indicating that instead of
being a second line supporting McCown's division, I was, in reality, the
foremost line on this part of the field, and that McCown's line had unaccountably
disappeared from my front.” Cleburne
did not have time to consider where McCown’s entire division had gone and
immediately threw skirmishers forward. (17)
While this was occurring, the question
about McCown’s disappearance was answered. After a late start, McCown had
encountered one Federal regiment which soon gave way. McCown then pursued the
retreating regiment to the west and nearly out off the battle map. Liddell
wrote: “after marching about 1 mile we came upon a brigade of Major-General
McCown, which had just repulsed a regiment of the enemy. In a moment's
conversation with General McCown, he wished me to take position in advance, as
his men were somewhat exhausted by the flight.” Liddell agreed, and McCown
placed his men to the far left of Cleburne’s
line. (18)
Lasting about 25 minutes, the fight was
fierce with all four of Cleburne’s
brigades participating. They were at the disadvantage, as the Federals opposing
them took cover in the cedar breaks and behind large limestone boulders.
Destructive fire from the Warren Light Artillery and Cleburne’s sharpshooters eventually compelled
them to retire to their second line, which was posted 150 yards beyond the
first on a hill protected by heavy batteries. Chasing the Federals and
screaming the Rebel Yell, Cleburne’s
line was met by a storm or grape, shell, and bullets. Bushrod Johnson sent his
artillery, Darden’s battery, onto a nearby hill, where it reigned down “a
well-directed fire of shell, shrapnel, and solid shot” over the Confederates
heads and into the ranks of Federal infantry and artillery. This “soon silenced
the enemy's pieces”. One of Johnson’s Tennessee
regiments, the 17th, charged during this lull in the fight and took
a battery of four guns. The second line Federal General McCook’s Corps soon
gave way. (19)
G.C. Kniffin, a Lieutenant Colonel near
Rosecrans’s headquarters, was surprised to see such a rapid routing of McCook’s
entire corps. He wrote:
Suddenly the woods on the right in the rear
of Negley appeared to be alive with men wandering aimlessly in the direction of
the rear. The roar of artillery grew more distinct, mingled with the continuous
volleys of musketry. The rear of a line of battle always presents the pitiable
spectacle of a horde of skulkers, men who, when tried in the fierce flame of
battle, find, often to their own disgust, that they are lacking in the element
of courage But the spectacle of whole regiments of soldiers flying in panic to
the rear was a sight never seen by the Army of the Cumberland except on that occasion. The
astounding intelligence was confirmed a moment later by a staff-officer from
McCook, calling for reenforcement. “Tell General McCook” said Rosecrans “to
contest, every inch of ground. If he holds them we will swing into Murfreesboro and cut them
off.” (20)
Cleburne’s Division was now
“engaged in a rapid, but not very orderly, pursuit of the enemy”. The new
federal line extended half a mile in length parallel to the Wilkinson turnpike
and was composed of Rousseau’s and Van Cleve's divisions. “It was a trying
position to these men to stand in line while the panic-stricken soldiers of
McCook's beaten regiments, flying in terror through the woods, rushed past
them. The Union lines could not fire for their comrades were between them and
the enemy.” (21)
The rapid pursuit of Cleburne’s Division was checked by the fresh
line of Federals. The division once again advanced. Liddell’s Brigade attacked
the enemy in an open field along with Johnson’s previously mentioned 17th
Tennessee.
The reason that Johnston’s
entire brigade was not involved in this fight was because they had run out of
ammunition. Polk’s and Wood’s Brigades encountered the enemy in the woods.
Polk wrote: “Following them
closely as we could, we encountered them again in a woods pasture immediately
in our front, in direction of Wilkinson Cross-Roads pike. After a few moments
fighting, we succeeded in breaking their lines, and again they fell back in
much confusion.” Polk and Wood’s pursuit soon became disorderly, with “each regiment mixing together” in the woods. The pursuit was
carried into a field where the Confederates could see a line of Federals posted
at the far end of this field. (22)
The two brigades of Polk and
Wood advanced steadily across this field, all the while being hit by
well-directed artillery fire. The enemy soon retired across the pike and fled
into an undergrowth of cedars. Wood’s sharpshooters and the 16th Alabama captured a
hospital and with it, 4 or 5 ordinance wagons.
Several enemy batteries, which was placed to the right of the pike, were firing upon the
ranks of the brigades. Polk and Wood wheeled to the right and charged through a
cornfield towards the batteries. These limbered immediately and fled before the
Confederates could reach them.
Meanwhile, on Cleburne’s
left flank, Liddell and Johnson’s one regiment which still
had ammunition, the 17th Tennessee,
advanced straight forward, constantly skirmishing with the enemy. After
driving the enemy out of a dug-in position in and around a cotton-gin, Cleburne’s left flank
encountered a hospital. After surrounding it, a man came running out of the
hospital, waving a white flag. In addition to the prisoners in the hospital, some
much-needed ammunition wagons and one artillery piece were captured.
Cleburne summarized: “In
this fight I captured 2 hospitals, nearly 1,000 prisoners, a train of
ammunition wagons, 1 piece of artillery, 3 or 4 caissons, and 2 wagons loaded
with medical stores. The Federal General [J. W.] Sill was killed near one of
the hospitals. The Seventeenth Tennessee, of Johnson's brigade, and the Second
Arkansas, of Liddell's brigade, contend for the honor of having first captured
the hospital and killed General Sill.” (23)
As had happened at Perryville, Cleburne’s swift advance
had taken him far beyond the support of other Confederate commands. As his
troops began to flank the enemies’ exposed line to the left, they received a
heavy artillery fire from near the turnpike. The chief-of artillery, Captain
Hotchkiss, directed Darden's
and Calvert's batteries to open fire on the Parrott and rifled guns. Polk
directed his brigade to advance to take the batteries, when they unexpectedly encountered a strong
line of Federals. After a brief fight, these broke and ran. Polk continued to
advance, crossing the turnpike and moving in the rear of the battery but had to
retire, ammunition nearly exhausted, when he received a deadly fire from the
batteries and supporting infantry. Although overmatched, Hotchkiss’ artillery
eventually drove the Federals’ Parrott and rifled guns back.
Wood’s Brigade, exhausted of
ammunition, fell back to the rear. While there, it was ordered by General
Hardee to move to the Confederate left, where the trains were being threatened.
While the rest of the division reformed on the Wilkinson pike, Liddell’s
Brigade pursued the enemy to the far left, making a stand in the valley of Overall's Creek. His artillery, posted
on a hill above the valley, eventually pushed the enemy back over the top of a
hill. Following the enemy, Liddell crested the embankment and came into full
view of the Nashville
turnpike and the enemy's trains below him. This meant that they were now well
behind the enemies’ lines and had reached their objective which had been planed
out the night before. Liddell immediately opened on the trains with his
artillery as Wharton’s cavalry charged. The trains quickly dispersed in haste
and confusion. When word of their accomplishment reached Cleburne, he advanced Johnson and Polk,
filling the gap between them.
Once again united, with the exception of
Wood, Smith’s brigade of Cheatham's division joined them and again Cleburne’s line advanced. Liddell
immediately met the enemy, steadily driving them back with destructive fire.
While the enemy fled, the rest of the division pursued them as Liddell’s line
reformed. Cleburne
wrote of the remainder of the day’s fighting:
My orders,
frequently received from General Hardee during the day, being to push the
enemy, and, if possible, give him no time to rally or select positions,
I did not halt the division or lose any time in rectifying distances or
alignments. The line had not advanced a quarter of a mile when a fresh line of
the enemy was discovered in open fields. He was supported by numerous and well-served
batteries. At this time I had but one battery (Liddell's). Polk's could not
follow through the heavy woods and Johnson's had been ordered by General Hardee
to remain in reserve near the Wilkinson pike. My line advanced steadily,
pouring in a deadly fire, and drove the enemy across a small dirt road. That
portion of his line opposite Johnson rallied behind a fence on the far side of
the dirt road, but was driven from there also, when his whole line disappeared
in the cedar woods, which here border the Nashville
pike, and were close behind him. Still another line of the enemy showed itself
on the edge of these cedars. A heavy fire of small-arms was immediately
directed upon him. He fled back in the woods, leaving the ground in front of
Johnson's brigade thickly covered with dead and wounded. Following up their
success, our men gained the edge of the cedars - Johnson's brigade capturing a
battery of Parrott guns - and were almost on the Nashville turnpike, in rear of
the original center of Rosecrans' army, sweeping with their fire his only line
of communication with Nashville; but it was now after 3 o'clock; my men had had
little or no rest the night before; they hail been fighting since dawn, without
relief, food, or water; they were comparatively without the support of
artillery, for the advance had been too rapid to enable my single battery to
get in position and answer the enemy; their ammunition was again nearly
exhausted, and our ordnance trains could not follow. At this critical moment
the enemy met my thinned ranks with another fresh line of battle, supported by
a heavier and closer artillery fire than I had yet encountered. A report also
spread, which I believe was true, that we were flanked on the right. This was
more than our men could stand. Smith's brigade was driven back in great
confusion. Polk's and Johnson's followed. As our broken ranks went back over
the fields before the fire of this fresh line, the enemy opened fire on our
right flank from several batteries which they had concentrated on an eminence
near the railroad, inflicting a heavier loss on Polk's brigade than it had
suffered in all the previous fighting of the day. The division was rallied on
the edge of the opposite woods, about 400 yards in rear of the scene of
disaster, though some of the men could not be stopped until they reached the
Wilkinson pike. Liddell's brigade, en echelon on my extreme left, was not
engaged in this last light and was moved back in good order to the line where
the other brigades rallied. Here I reformed my division as rapidly as possible,
Polk's brigade on the right, Johnson's in the center, and Liddell's on the
left. A fresh supply of ammunition was served out, and I waited in momentary
expectation for an advance of the enemy in overwhelming force. He never
advanced a foot, and the question presented itself, Ought I to again advance? I
was now in possession of 3 miles of ground conquered from the enemy, large
numbers of prisoners, cannon, and small-arms. Another repulse,
and I might lose all these and cause the demoralization and destruction of my
division. I immediately reported the situation to General Hardee, and was
ordered by him to hold the ground I had won, rest, and reorganize my division
and await further orders. Pushing my pickets well forward, I bivouacked in line
of battle on the same line which the division rallied on after the
repulse.
As
the troops made camp that night, New Year’s Eve 1862, Robert D. Smith wrote,
“Our line of battle today was 7 miles long and from daylight until 9 o’clock at
night the rattle of musketry and the roar of cannon was
almost incessant. The position I hold today as Chief of Ordnance required me to
stay with Genl. Cleburne most of the day and anyone that has ever been with him
knows that he seldom ever avoids danger, and that where the fight is hardest
there is sure to be…Thus far we can say the victory is ours”. Irving Buck
recalled:
For several hours I
rode over portions of the battlefield, thickly covered with the unburied dead.
Occasionally I would come upon some party who had found and were interring a
comrade, by moonlight the brightness of which formed an agreeable contrast with
the stormy scenes just closed. My horse would start and shy coming upon a
corpse and, being alone, the scenes unsettled my nerves and called up some
gloomy reflections.
The
division kept the fires up all night for their wounded and those of the enemy
who were close enough to reach, laying “them in rows upon the ground, both
friend and foe placed together”. (24)
New Year’s Day, 1863 dawned much the way
that 1862 had ended: an occasional artillery shell crashed through the trees,
but no musketry could be heard. Bragg expected the enemy to have retired in the
night, but an early morning reconnaissance proved otherwise. The Federals in Cleburne’s front guarding
the Nashville Turnpike were still there and they appeared to be fresh. Bragg
was perplexed. He ordered Cleburne
to hold his ground and await orders. But the afternoon turned into night and no
orders or reinforcements arrived.
The following morning, the sound of axes
could be heard near the turnpike. Cleburne sent
a hasty note to Bragg, informing him of this development, hoping it would
dissuade him from an order to attack which Cleburne knew would be futile, as his men
were exhausted and outnumbered. Later that day, Cleburne
heard the sound of musketry to his right. It was Breckenridge’s Division
engaging the enemy in a failed charge which Bragg had ordered. That night, the
Federals made a cautious advance across the turnpike to feel the
Confederates. Cleburne’s
sharpshooters and skirmishers opened fire and drove them back across the road.
Shortly after this, Cleburne
received a note, directing him to fall back. By the following night, the entire
army was in retreat, retracing their steps in sleet and rain. Cleburne’s Division ,
which began the fight with 6,045 men, lost 2,081 in killed, wounded, and
missing. Out of about 30,000 infantry and artillery and 5,000 cavalry, Bragg
estimated his losses at about 10,000; Rosecrans, who begun with 43,000 infantry
and artillery and 3,300 cavalry, estimated his losses at 12,770.
Sources
1: Robert D. Smith: page 74
: Ibid
: Ibid
: Ibid
2: Pat Cleburne, Confederate General: chapter
8 page 96
3: Stonewall of the West: chapter 6 page 104
4: A Meteor
Shining Brightly: Chapter 5 page 97
: Stonewall of the
West: chapter 6 page 103
: Confederate Veteran: 1893 page 14
: Ibid
: Robert D. Smith:
page 85
5: SAM Wood’s report of the Triune skirmish and the Battle of Murfreesboro: O.R. Series I Vol. XX part 1
6: O.R. Series I Vol. XX part
1
7: O.R. Series I Vol. XX part
1
8: O.R. Series I Vol. XX part
1
9: Cleburne’s Report of the Battle of Murfreesboro:
O.R.
Series I Vol. XX part I pg 843-852
: Hardee’s Report of Battle of
Murfreesboro: O.R. Series I
Vol. XX part 1
10: O.R. Series I Vol. XX part 1
: Ibid
11: Bragg’s Report of the Battle of Murfreesboro: O.R. Series I Vol. XX part 1
12: Stonewall
of the West: chapter 6 page 107
13:
O.R. Series I Vol. XX part I pg 843-852
: Ibid
14:
O.R. Series I Vol. XX part I pg 843-852
15: O.R. Series I
Vol. XX part I pg 843-852
16: O.R. Series I
Vol. XX part I pg 843-852
17: O.R. Series I
Vol. XX part I pg 843-852
18: Liddell’s report of the Battle of Murfreesboro: O.R.
Series I Vol. XX part 1 pg 856-860
19: Bushrod
Johnson’s report of the Battle of Murfreesboro: O.R Series I Vol. XX part I pg. 874-882
: Ibid
20: Battles and leaders of
the civil war: The Battle of Stone’s
River by G.C. Kniffin
21: O.R. Series I Vol. XX part I pg 843-852
: The Battle of Stone’s River
22: Lucius Polk’s report of the Battle of Murfreesboro:
O.R Series I Vol. XX part I pg 852-855
: O.R. Series I Vol. XX part 1
23: O.R.
Series I Vol. XX part I pg 843-852
24: O.R. Series I
Vol. XX part I pg 843-852
: Robert D. Smith: page 88
: A Meteor
Shining Brightly: Chapter 5 page 92
: Robert D. Smith:
page 88